Werder Bremen 0-2 Mainz: maniacal pressing pays off

An excellent example of how belief in your own qualities, discipline and hard work can combine to result in such a fabulous display of football. On paper almost every single Werder Bremen player is better than his Mainz counterpart, but Mainz' freakishly high-tempo approach caused Bremen more problems than they could handle.

Bremen started the game in their new-style 4-2-3-1. They were still missing their preferred centre-back partnership (Mertesacker-Naldo), so Pasanen (excellent against Bayern München) and Prödl started again. Mainz lined up in a more tactically interesting formation, something between a 4-3-3 and a 4-4-2 with a midfield diamond. Lewis Holtby was the fulcrum of the midfield, and he drifted intellegently into little pockets of space time and time again.
Hot prospect André Schürrle started on the bench, with Szalai and Risse not acting as out-and-out forwards, but more as inside-forwards, usually taking up a position between opposition full-back and centre-back. This is very important in Thomas Tuchel's system, since his type of high-octane pressing requires the two forwards to attack the full-back on their side whenever he goes forward with the ball. Bremen's usual fluid attacking football didn't come off, precisely because nobody in a green shirt had any time on the ball. Mainz never had any less than three men around the Bremen player in possession, which meant that they were closed off and had to resort to the long ball all too often:


From left to right: Karhan, Risse and Holtby hounding Tim Borowski


Holtby, Bungert and Caligiuri denying Aaron Hunt any space to move or play the ball


Even after Risse's well-taken goal, when you might have expected Mainz to calm down, sit deep, soak up the pressure and hang on for a narrow win, they kept on playing their football, giving Bremen no chance to get their combination play going. Here no less than four players are in the vicinity of Marko Marin. In this way, they suffocated Bremen all day long.


And even after Schürrle's goal, they kept on pressing. FIVE players (the front five) are all running and harrying. When something works, why change it when it so obviously works?

Tuchel has definitely watched Barcelona, but to copy the pressing aspect of their game and then build on it to stifle all before them so effectively is to be commended. Note that Mainz are not throwing everybody forward heedlessly or without plan, but that there is accurate method to their pressing game, and that, when they get the ball, they always look to play football instead of hoofing it forward and running after it very fast.

A word of caution, though. This extreme pressing requires that everyone in the team changes their position relevant to the rest of the eleven. If Karhan, on the left side of midfield, moves to close down Fritz on Mainz' left, Polanski and Caligiuri shuttle over to get as many players as possible as close to the ball as possible. This leaves a lot of space on the other side, which can be exploited by sides who move the ball around quickly or spread the play effectively:


Notice the space (in purple) on Mainz' right (the black line connects the Mainz midfield). Mainz are very narrow, which leaves acres of space for Silvestre to exploit. Fortunately for Tuchel's men, not only is Silvestre not able to play as a buccaneering left-back (too slow and weak on the ball); but Bremen were also just as narrow, with Marin, Arnautovic and Hunt looking to come inside. Against Bayern this weekend, with Lahm and Contento storming forward whenever possible, Mainz will have to work even harder. Not that that will faze them.

Everton 3-3 Manchester United: United need to learn to defend

A crazy game, with some truly awful defending from both sides. Everton started without a recognized striker, United with only Berbatov up top, who, as we shall see, was not really playing in the role his number (9) might have suggested.
It should be noted that United only fielded three players younger than 28 (Evans (22), Fletcher (26) and Nani (23)). Ferguson, who has lost a lot of quality over the past couple of seasons, is clearly relying on experience to get him through this season with some silverware to boot. That old heads don't always stay calm under pressure and prevail was all too clear at the end of this game.

A first surprise, perhaps, is the continued inclusion of Gary Neville. Rafael had a couple of brilliant performances towards the end of last season, but since his foolish red card against Bayern München in last year's Champions League, Ferguson has preferred Neville. Neville is used to getting a lot of stick, often unfairly: speed has never been his forte, but his positioning and tackling are still good. He played this game in a similar role to Giovanni van Bronckhorst in Holland's successful World Cup run: stick close to your man, don't allow him time and space to turn. Van Bronckhorst shackled his direct opponent more often than not in this way, and Neville did exactly the same with Pienaar in this game:


Neville (yellow) sticks close and denies Pienaar space. Since Evra doesn't do the same, this requires enormous awareness and discipline from the right winger (Nani) and the right centre back (Vidic).


Pienaar has dropped back into his own half, and even there, Neville has followed him

Pienaar, despite his goal, didn't have a great game, so fair play to Ferguson and Neville, who dealt with the very real threat of the South African well.

Man United's best man was Darren Fletcher, whose importance to this very workmanlike United side cannot be overstated. He is very similar to Frank Lampard in that he times his infiltration into the opponent's defence exceptionally well, but he gives so much solidity and steel to the United midfield that his absence is almost always keenly felt in defence as much as attack. David Moyes recognized this threat, and put Johnny Heitinga in front of his defence to deal with it. He was supposed to shadow Fletcher, but the fact that the Scot scored a goal from one of his infiltrations and that he caused confusion whenever he stormed forward indicates that the Dutchman didn't stick to his task very well:


Heitinga (pink) sticking close to Fletcher

Berbatov posed another problem to the Everton defence: he played the false nine role perfectly. He dropped back into midfield almost from the start, and neither Jagielka nor Distin marked him. This gave the Bulgarian all kinds of space to profit from, either by playing as a sort of playmaker or by running at the centre backs:


Berbatov (red) dropping back. Fletcher is bottom right, the furthest man forward for United. This almost reciprocal relation (Berbatov dropping back into midfield, Fletcher moving forward into attack) between the two was very effective.


Berbatov with way too much space to run at Distin (left) and Jagielka (right). Notice the gap between the two Everton centre backs, with Distin pulled towards the United infiltrating midfielder, and Jagielka struggling to close the space.

These tactical tricks gave United the chance to cruise past the Merseyside outfit. The fact that they didn't must be of some concern to Ferguson. This freak result may be just that, but considering the fact that United gave away a goal to Fulham in the last minute in their last game as well, Ferguson will be putting the United team through their paces on the training field in the coming weeks.

Hoffenheim 2-0 Schalke: Magath has his work cut out for him

Two teams with very different approaches to the game: Hoffenheim scour the continent for talented, young players (Demba Ba, Vukcevic, Sigurdsson); Schalke, who, under Magath, at least, first had no money and went for free players (Raul), went for broke at the end of the transfer window: Jurado and Huntelaar are good (and relatively expensive) players who will seriously enhance this Schalke side.



Magath has, it seems, been trying to transform Ivan Rakitic in very much the same way as Louis van Gaal transformed Bastian Schweinsteiger last season. From an exciting left-sided attacking midfielder (or, though less frequently, a central attacking midfielder), Schweinsteiger shielded his defence and was the man who his defenders turned to when in possession. He started the attack, he orchestrated the play, he decided the tempo, he was the metronome. He performed this role brilliantly at the World Cup with Germany (maybe Magath got his idea there). Rakitic was mostly an impact sub for Croatia at EURO 2008, but Magath thinks Rakitic will perform better and more constantly in this central position. Beside him, Jermaine Jones performs the 'Khedira role', as a more infiltrating, running, box-to-box midfielder, who is not afraid to tackle and does his defensive duty effectively. In this way, Magath is not only trying to copy Germany, but also Bayern, where these roles are filled by Schweinsteiger and van Bommel respectively. So, Magath plays a 4-2-3-1. But this 4-2-3-1 has some interesting idiosyncracies.

Magath had a problem against Hoffenheim's three man midfield: a 3-versus-2 situation. The first option was to ask the central player in his own bank of three (Raùl) to drop back and help out against this threat. However, Raul is not as fit as he used to be, and this would drain the energy he needs to perform in his own area (i.e. just behind Huntelaar), and has never been the most energetic when it comes to defensive duties. Magath found another way: Moritz man-marked Salihovic, Hoffenheim's excellent Bosnian midfield maestro. And by man-marking, I mean man-marking:


Salihovic has stayed central, so Moritz stays central


Salihovic has wandered to Hoffenheim's left-hand side, so Moritz follows him there.

This posed another problem: if Moritz stayed central when Schalke were in possession, Schalke's right would only have Metzelder, a makeshift full-back in this match, as an attacking outlet, if he even joined the attack. So, when in possession, Moritz pushed out to the right-hand side and played more as a right-sided midfielder, between central midfield and right flank. This was undoubtedly a very difficult and draining role, but Moritz performed it well and was probably one of Schalke's better performers on the night.


The two midfields, with Moritz (green) and Edu (red) wide

Hoffenheim were more enthusiastic and driven than Schalke. Demba Ba (purple), especially, was willing to make diagonal runs into the box without the ball, which caused Metzelder all sorts of problems (Metzelder's inclusion as a right-back was pretty mind-boggling. He was replaced at half time):



Hoffenheim's star performer, however, was Luis Gustavo (yellow). He linked defence and attack very well, was always available, and was always leading the charge when pressing the Schalke midfield. I have written about this role, and how often it is neglected or not carried out well enough (see Leverkusen, with neither Vidal nor Ballack willing to take it up, or Russia, where Shirokov is too limited a player to do it well):


Gustavo's positioning is excellent here: his defenders have the option to pass the ball to him, and he has the technical ability to pick out a man with a good pass.

And so Luis Gustavo filled the role that Rakitic was supposed to fill. That's not to say Rakitic had a bad game, but he was, for large parts of the game, anonymous, and is obviously still getting used to this new position. He could do worse than look at Luis Gustavo in this game to see what is required of this new type of deep-lying midfielder, in the Busquets and Schweinsteiger mould: defend well and start attacks. This requires positional discipline, concentration, 3D vision of the pitch at all times to pick out the best passes, and a team that is trained to make runs off and towards the ball, so he can surprise and vary his game. It's a team game, and Hoffenheim is a much better unit than Schalke.

Russia 0-1 Slovakia: Russian gung ho approach fails to pay dividends

A good game, with a brutally efficient and hard-working Slovakia ultimately overcoming Dick Advocaat's Russia.



Advocaat has maintained Guus Hiddink's approach, believing that, with a relatively weak defence, trying to outscore opponents is a more sure way to make progress. Anyukov and Zhirkov, on paper the full-backs, functioned more as out-and-out wingers. This is fine, as long as you keep cover for your ponderous centre halves. Russia failed to provide that, as Shirokov strayed out of position far too often to support the already gung ho Russians in their exciting attacks.


Shirokov (black) in a good position to protect his defence


Shirokov just a couple of seconds later, having joined the attack. This has left Berezutsky and Ignashevich open:



Of course, Russia were then enjoying a period of sustained pressure, so maybe it is normal to throw numbers forward then. However, even in the first half Shirokov, who has his uses, but is a fairly limited player, joined the attacks almost incessantly:


An almost extraordinary number of players have joined this attack: not only Dzagoev (yellow), who is of course supposed to be there, but also Shirokov (black), Zyrianov (green), and Semshov (red). This means that the entire Russian midfield has moved up, which is, at this level, tactical suicide. Slovakia didn't profit because they didn't look to profit: 1-0 up in Russia, they defended tooth and nail to keep their advantage.

Another example: look how many players are in the Slovakia penalty area. Zyrianov and Semshov are both there, joined by Pogrebnyak, Dzagoev, and Zhirkov (extreme left). Arshavin is waiting just outside the area, and Anyukov (top right) is there as well:



However, except for a good period at the beginning of the second half, Russia suffered from the Arsenal syndrome: trying to pass the ball into the net, looking for the perfect goal, threading passes through the eye of the needle, when there are better options available. The Arsenal syndrome of course also includes a sense of playing too narrow, even with ultra-attacking full-backs. Dzagoev and Arshavin both came inside to make room for Anyukov and Zhirkov respectively, but even they came inside more and more as the game progressed. The introduction of Bystrov (pink) helped ease this problem: he generally stayed wide, gave Russia another option and was generally dangerous and sharp on the ball:



In the end, though, Russia simply didn't have a high enough ball circulation to pull Slovakia's two banks of 4 defenders and 5 midfielders apart, and they were too slow to play the ball to the flanks to force Slovakia's defenders to make a choice. Until the introduction, Slovakia's defence just stayed narrow, since Dzagoev and Arshavin came inside. Stoch and Jendrisek were disciplined on their flanks to contain Anyukov and Zhirkov reasonably well. The Slovakian midfield put in an excellent shift and worked hard to restrict space to Russia's more creative outlets:


Jendrisek (1), Krhin (2), Stoch (3), Strba (4), and Hamsik (5, who was excellent and was box-to-box for almost the entirety of the game) keeping a good line

Russia's gung ho approach was refreshing and fun to watch, and Advocaat can count himself a bit unlucky not to get anything out of this game. A mistake by Akinfeev led to Stoch's fantastic goal, and after that, Slovakia restricted the Russian waves of attack well. However, gung ho means nothing without a system, and just throwing players forward in hopes that someone will get on the end of an attack is not going to work every time. And against (even) better opponents, with all due respect to Slovakia, the Russian midfield's lack of defensive discipline will inevitably lead to larger problems at the back.

Barcelona's pressing game: the importance of Busquets

Josep Guardiola has revolutionised modern football with this Barcelona side. Whereas the focus of the media is always on their technical skill (which they have in abundance), their great strength lies in their pressing and defensive discipline. The game against Santander (0-3 win) was a clear example.



We see all the ingredients of a modern side: a false number 9 (Messi), with Villa in the role he is accustomed to from the Spain side (as a striker who finds his space between the central defender and the full-back) and Iniesta in a relatively free role. One of the cornerstones of Guardiola's philosophy is pressing all over the pitch. Some examples:


Keita has followed Diop deep into the Santander half.


Maxwell, the Barca left back, has followed Kennedy into his own half.


Dani Alves is putting enormous pressure on his direct opponent, deep in the Santander half.

These are not coincidences. This is the result of systematic training on putting the opposition under overwhelming pressure and denying them space. It is interesting to see how underrated Seydou Keita is in all this. He's a rugged athlete, who can run all day, and nevers gives the opposing midfield players any room or time on the ball.

However, the World Cup has also given Guardiola some new ideas.



Busquets (red) has fallen back into a massive gap between the two central defenders Piqué (who is receiving the ball) and Abidal. We recognize this tactic from the Mexico side at the World Cup: Osorio and Masa Rodriguez in central defence, with Rafa Marquez (not coincidentally a Barcelona player then) dropping back as a sort of anachronistic sweeper. This give one of two central defenders the option of taking the ball out of defence (as Piqué is planning to do here).
Busquets, whom I would argue is the single most important player in this Barca side, did this a number of times in this game, to great effect: not only did this give the freedom to Piqué, who is extremely comfortable on the ball, to join the attack, but he also gave himself time on the ball: by dropping deep, he shook off his marker, so he could receive the ball, look up, and play the right pass. Busquets is not given enough credit for his technical skill, but as long as it is recognized only by Guardiola, and not by opposition coaches, Barcelona will be able to build from the back without any pressure.


Busquets is able to bring the ball out of defence without any pressure whatsoever

Busquets is important in another way too. As has been pointed out by Jonathan Wilson and David Winner, in the great Ajax side of the seventies, of which Guardiola is without any doubt a great admirer (it was, after all, Johan Cruyff, the master of that team, who made a lasting impression on Guardiola when he was coach at the Nou Camp), Johan Neeskens was, maybe somewhat unknowingly, the cause for a systematic pressing game and offside trap to develop. As Neeskens was a very aggressive player, he followed his man (usually the opposition playmaker) everywhere, even when he dropped back to his own half. Consequentially, the Ajax defence had to follow Neeskens (in Total Football, the most important rule was: keep the playing field big when in possession, small when out of possession) to keep the space between defence and midfield manageable. This meant a very high defensive line. Combined with extensive pressure, this Ajax side often suffocated the opposition. Busquets is playing the Neeskens role for Barcelona, to great effect:



It is important to note that Barcelona are already 3-0 up. Still, Barcelona are putting enormous pressure on the Santander defence. Busquets has just sprinted into view, and is forcing his defence to come up with him. Not only, then, does Busquets press the Santander team by cutting off the space in front of their defence, he marshalls his defence, and Barcelona deny Santander space. This is not as easy as it sounds. It requires enormous levels of stamina, concentration and, maybe most importantly, guts. If the opposition are good enough to play their way out of this predicament presented by Barca pressing, they have a good chance of a free route to goal. However, Guardiola has trained his charges so well that this almost never happens against relatively weak La Liga opposition. It is worth noting, however, that this approach worked wonders againt Arsenal last season too, in the first leg of the Champions League quarter final. Barcelona are just that good.